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I

INTRODUCTION

As balance of payments difficulties have continued to
plague most LDC's (with the exception of some of the major
petroleum-producing countries), most LDC's have been forced
to adopt, a.t least implicitly, a strategy for attaining rapid
growth within the confines of a severe balance of payments
constraint.

Most LDC's have opted for one 6f'two such strategies

-- the import substitution strategy (in which tariffs, quantitative
restrictions and multiple exchange rates have played a large
role) or the IMF-supported package of monetary and fiscal austerity.
Ten years ago many countries might have looked to foreign
aid as a means of be.lancing payments and, at the same time,
channelling foreign resources into their economic development.
However, the prospect for this rather pleasant alternative is
not nearly as bright as it was then, and it is evidpnt that
much of the adjustment must take place within and be achieved
by the LDC's themselves.

Furthermore, as time passes, it becomes

increasingly clear that neither of these alternative strat,gies
appears to have been successful in allowing many of the LDC's
to sustain what might be regarded as satisfactory growth in
terms of per capita income or virtually any other index of
development over a period as long as two decades.

In addition,

there has been increasing recognition of the additional costs in
terms of allocative and dynamic efficiency and ot administrative
capability ot the import substitution strategy via exchange
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on the one hand, and in terms ot structural rigidity,

product concentration and income distribution associated with
2
fiscal and monetary austerity on the other. These rather disappointing
results have, in a number of· instan4!es~r.ibeen achieved·'~n with rather
generous amounts of toreign assistance.
Indeed, the few LDC' s that have sustained rapid growth in
the postwar period -- such as Israel, Greece, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong,
Spain and possibly Portugal, Zambia, and Peru3 -- would each seem
to have departed significantly from the more commonly adopted "importsubatitution~ or''"IMF-elasiHca.I".-strategies· by.. leaning towElt'ds •exbhan~e
ra~e-oriented policy packages emphasizing export promotion.

Partly as

as result of this experience increasing attention has been devoted at
both the empirical and theoretical levels to the role of exchange rate
policy in the economic development of LDC's. 4 Nevertheless, it would
be dangerous if not foolish, to argue that the difference in growth
performance of the several rapidly growing LDC's listed above from
that of all the other LDC's could or should be attributed entirely to
a difference in the strategy of meeting their pers1sting balance of
1.Among others in a rapidly growing critique of import substitution
are Gustav Ranis [85 ], David Felix [ 36] and Scitovsky [ 93 ].

2E.g., see Lauchlin Currie [ 27

J

3According to AID (102] and OECD [ 79] statistics, these are the
only LDC's (other than the larger petroleum producers) that would seem
to have doubled their per capita incomes since 1950.

4Among the empirical studies which have attempted to relate ex
change rate policy to export performance are those of Sheahan and Clark
[ 94 ] , Urdinola and Mallon [107 ] and Johnson [ 56 ] :for Colombia,
Clark [ 20] for Brazil, Islam 54] for Pakistan, Baba and Tatemoto
[
5] for Japan, Nugent and DePrano [ 78 J for Ecuador, and on an
international cross-section basis that of DeVries [ 29 ]. Cooper [ 26]
has attempted to assess the short run impact on the balance of payments
of 24 devaluations in 19 different LDC's. In contrut to the rather
voluminous theoretical literature relating exchange rates with balance

-3payments problems.

Indeed, each of these countries would seem to

have enjoyed very special advantages in terms of external assistance,
geographical location and a considerable amount of good luck.
Any attempt to separate the effects of these various factors is
likely to be beset

by

a number of difft~ult methodological problems

stemming from tlE fact that almost nothing is constant or completely
exogenous in the long run.

For one thing, exchange rates -- even pegged

ones -- are not entirely exogenous in the long run.

Since countries

with excellent export growth will be less likely to devaluate than
countries with slower export growth, any attempt to estimate the impact
of exchange rates policy (as measured by the ~rice of foreign exchange
in terms of domestic currency) on exports -- a relationship that should
be positive -- would be subject to a negative bias of possibly sizeable
magnitude due to the presence of a simultaneous and negative relation
ship between export growth and exchange rates.

Another problem is that

devaluations are often accompanied by various kinds of reforms, such as
import liberalization (a relaxation of import duties and/or quantitative
restrictions on imports) or exchange rate unification (a movement away
from multiple exchange rates), or by simultaneous attempts to complement
or compensate for the effects of devaluation by monetary and fiscal
constraint, increased export taxes, etc.

Still another complexity that

has not been sufficiently appreciated is the fact that, although exchange
rate policy may operate both on the supply of exports andon the denuuia for
exports, the precise way in which it operates on each of these factors
may differ.
(Footnote

Thus, while it may be the exchange rate relative to the

4 continued from previous page)

of payments adjustments, a rather unique theoretical study relating
exchange rate policy with economic growth is that of Baldwin [ 7 ].

-4ratio of export prices of the country is to those of the rest of the
world that is relevanu in the demand for exports, it may be the ex
change rate and export prices of the country ~re relative'lto"oth er.jrices
of country is that are relevant to the supply of exports.

It is no

wonder, then that previous attempts to demonstrate the impact of ex
change rate policy on export performance primarily in the 1ostwar period
(in which the feedback has been q~ite evident) have not been entirely
successful.
The purpose of this pape~ is to explore the relationship between
exchange rate policy on the one hand, and export performance and
economic growth, on the other hand, during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.

This period offers particular advantages in over

coming at least some of the methodological problems which beset
similar investigations in subsequent periods.

This was a period in

which the vast majority of the countries of the world were explicitly
or implicitly committed to either the silver standard or the gold
standard. Since the price of silver in terms of gold fell rather
steadily between 187~ and 1894 (as shown in Table l) due both to
relative changes in supply conditions in the producing countries and
to relative changes in demand conditions {especially as more and more
countries switched away from the silver to gold and paper currencies)
this meant a more or less gradual implicit devaluation by the countries
of approxmmately 50% over these two decades.
What is important to realize is that this kind of de facto de
valuation on the part of each of the silver standard countries with
respect to each of the gold standard countries was largely unintention
al and was totally independent of the balance of payments positions, of
any individual country and therefore was not prompted by poor export
performance of any particular country.

This means that any estimate

-4a

TABLE I
THE RELATIVE PRICES OF SILVER AND GOLD 1868-1897
Date

London
Price of Bar Silver
in terms gold (pence
per ounce) (l)

U.S. Annue.J. Average
Price of gold in
terms of' silver
(ounce per ounce) (2)

Price of U.S. Dollar
in Mexican pesos on
New York Market (3)

15.59
15.60
15,57
15.57
15.63
15,92
16.17
16.59
17.88
17.22
17,94
18.40
18.05
18.16
18.19
18.64
l.8.57
19.41
20.78
21.13
21.99
22.10
19,76
20,92
23. 72
26.47
32.56
31.61
30.65
34.34

1.099
1,099
1.111
l.124
1,119
1.134
1.143
1.157
1.225
1.266
1.318
1.353
1.319
1.195
1.346
1.522
1.855
1.946
1.866
1.976
2.232

60.50
60.44
60.56
60.50
60.31
59.19
58.31
56.69
53.13
54.81
52.63
51.25
52.25
51,63
51.81
50,56
50,69
48.56
45.38
44.69
42.88
42.69
47.75
45.06
39. 75
35.56
28.94
29.81
30,81
27,56

1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
Notes:
(1)

Source:

Study of' Silver Values and Commodity Prices, Ministry of
Industries (23, Table 1, pp. 2-4.]

(2)

Source:

Patrick [ 80, Table 2, p. 197]

(3)

Source:

Mexico [ 73, p. 153]

-5ot the effect of devaluation on export growth during the 1873-18~5
period will be free of the previously-m entioned negative bias which
arises when there is a negative feedback effect from export performance
to exchange rate in the long run.

Since, even among less developed

countries there were a relatively large number of countries on each
type ot metal standard (and still others with inconvertib le paper
currencies) , we can obtain a fairly large number of observation s of the
effect of an identical devaluation under the same set of conditions.

A

third advantage is that by and large this was a period of peace in the
world and one in which tariif and quantitativ e restriction s, multiple
exchange rates and other complicatin g factors playei a very minor role
in internation al trade.
An outline of one 0f the possible ways in which €X~hange between

rate policy may promote development is presented in Section II.

Since

the effects of exchange depreciatio n during the same period of time
has been the subject of a number of previous studies, in Section III
we gi~e a brief critical account of some of these studies.

IV

and

In Sections

V, we contrast the export performance and growth performance ,

respectivel y of countries (primarily LDC's) on the silver and gold
standards.

Some conclusions and qualificatio ns are stated in Section VL.
II THEORY

Without doubt the most important and direct effect that exchange
rate devaluation should have is on exports.

It would seem likely that

it should be primarily through its affect on exports that exchange rate
policy would effect capital formation, efficiency, output and employ
ment.
The hypothesize d effect on exports may be illustrated by Figure 1.
Domestic demand is given by Dd, foreign demand by df, total de~and by
ABDt

0

end domestic supply by s -- all stated 1n terms of the domestic
1

-6currency (pesos). If perfect competition is assumed in all markets, s1
will intersect the total demand curve in the segment AB that is made
up entirely of domestic demand.

Equilibrium is therefore at the

price Po and domestic demand is d0 and there are no exports.

A

devaluation of CE will shift the foreign demand curve to Df and

OE
Equilibrium. is now at P1and t 1 , domestic
cons~~tion now at d1 , and (t 1 - d1 ) is exported. Continued devaluation
would shift Df further outward and exports would continue to grow and

hence total demand to Dt.

domestic consumption of exportables would eventually disappear.
However, (a la Smith and others) the increase in the size of the market
would be likely to induce complementary investments, resource shifts,
external economies and technological changes sufficient to shift the
domestic supply curve outward over time to s2 which would yield a new
equilibrium at P2 and t 2 in which both domestic consumption and exports
would increase to d2 and (t 2 - d2 ), respectively. This increase in the
size of the market would be likely to shift Dd and S out further, etc •••
The alternative strategy which we have previously labeled "IMF•
classical", would be to shift Dd downward to Dd via contractionary
monetary and fiscal, policies.

This strategy would create some exports

(e ) but domestic demand would be eliminated and hence with a smaller

3

total market, it would be unlikely that the supply curve would be
shifted outward over time as in the previous case.

(In fact the supply

curve might very well shift inward over time so that the incentive to
exports via the ;;Il-1F-classical 11 strategy would turn, out to be short
lived).
While it is possible to conceive of supply and demand conditions
in which devaluation would not have such a pronounced effect on ex
ports, Figure l should be sufficient to point out that in the long-run
the context of economic growth, the static effects of exchange rate
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-7policy which may be analyzed in terms of elasticity and/or
absorption conditions, are likely to be swamped by the less
tractible dynamic effects.
As the devaluating country (or countries) moves its
resources in such a way as to increase the allocation of resources to the areas of its comparative advantage {which undoubtedly
would be changing over time), aggregate allocative efficiency would
increase.

The rise in the rate of growth of exports would be likely

to permit some relaxation of quantitative restrictions on imports
and thereby increase the number of areas in which domestic producers
would face competition from the outside world.

Furthermore, a more

rapid rate of growth is likely to induce a greater-·number of competitors
into the market.
be improved.

As competition increases, allocative efficiency would

The increase in allocative efficiency both from move

ment toward comparative advantage

and increased competition would

raise income and hence savings and investment probably faster than the
rate of growth income.

Foreign capital (and possibly other foreign

resources) would likely he induced by the expansion of the economy.and
increased investment opportunities especially i~ the export sect9rs
in which foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs are likely to feel most
comfortable.

The increased capital stock (and perhaps other factor

accumulations) would increase potential output.

The new capital goods

(perhaps embodyin~ technological change) and the expanding size of the
markets would induce technological chanr;e (or dynamic eff'icien·cy)
associated with and derived from internal and external economies at the
micro level.
Increased output from these sources, and from the effect of
devaluation on the price of investment ~oods (lar~ely i~ported) relative
to wages (which would depend largely on the price of home goods) would

-8increase the demand for labor and hence employment would be expected
to grow without necessarily depending on money illusion on the part of
the workers.
Connections between continuous devaluation t.nd growth otber·thlln
those briefly sketched here are also possible.

For example, devaluation

can effect income distribution and thereby influence savings and import
propensities 5 • Devaluations can also influence prices and hence the
real value of assets and desired assets, the relative rates of return
6

on financial and real assets and hence savings and investment rates •
Also via the effect on exports and hence money supply and interest
rates (in a mercantilist world) exchange rate policy could affect
investment and growth.

Te1ms of trade effects on growth rate policy,

and repercussions thereof, would also have various kinds of effects on
growth in the long run7 •

Since a variety of possible mechanisms would

seem likely to exist, a large and rather sophisticated model would seem
to be required to integrate and test the relative significance of the
various possible ways in which exchange rate policy may affect growth.
It would therefore seem wise to seek empirical support for an overall

effect of currency devaluation on econorric growth before going about the
model building.

This would seem part lcularly warranted in view of the

previous empirical findinGS {to be discussed in the next section) which
have not always supported the existence of such a relationship.

5see Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro [ 30
6see lTurray Kemp [ 58 1
7See

s. c.

Tsiang [ 98 ]

J

-9III A CRITICAL SURVEY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE
OF THE FALL IN SILVER PRICES ON DEVELOPL1ENT
OF SILVER STANDARD COUNTRIES

EFFECTS

or the studies and commissions established to investigate the
effect of the depreciation of silver on economic c?nditions in both silver
and gold standard countries some have produced results emphasizing the
benefits of currency devaluation and some have concluded that on balance
the effects were largely negative.

Although probably a majority of the

studies undertaken in the silver countries revealed.net benefits of the
steady depreciation of silver in terms of gold, almost all those

.,

undertaken in gold standard countries revealed some of the obvious dis
advantages of currency appreciation 8 , the studies which have attracted
the most attention have been those which concluded that implicit exchange
devaluation had not been unfavorable to the orderly economic development
of certain of the silver countries.

Particularly influential among

these studies were those of the subcommittee of the Singapore Chamber
of Commerce of 1897 and the Straits Settlements Currency Committee of
1902 referring to the experience of the Straits Settlements and Hala.,va
8
For example, there were the views of the Mexican delegation to the
Brussels conference of 1892: 11 The depreciation of silver as it appeared
to foreign countries --- has produced an actual premium on exportation.
Articles which were not exported formerly are sold now in the markets of
Europe and the United States 11 ( Q,uoted in Hussell [ 91, p. 398]. Among
other favorable reports in silver countries were those of the lfinister
of Finance in Chile, reported in Fetter [ 38], Kernmener's study of
T'iexico [ 57 , p. 479-483], the Silver Currency Commission (Swettenham
Commission) in Ceylon of 1893 reported in Gunasekera [ 48 ], the French
Ministerial Commission on Indochina in 1902 reported in Thin [ 97 ]
and of the Japanese Commission reported in Leavins [ 62, p. 110]. Among
those indicating unfavorable effects of currency appreciation in aold
standard was that of the Berlin Silver Commission 1893-4 and similar
conclusions were no doubt the inspiration of the International Conferences
of 1878 and 1881 reported in Leavins [ 62 ] • Uhile the Ministry of
Industries study in China crune out against silveri:Ln:.1935 [ 23 ] , it
is signit.icant to note that this conclusion was prompted not b,1 the
depreciation or silver 1920-1931 but the subsequent sharp appreciation
of silver 1932-35.

-10-

(reported in Kemmerer [ 57 ] ) , the reports of the Herschell Committee
of 1893 [ 57 ] and of the Fowler Committee of 1898 [ 39 ] and aleo
Remer' s study of China [ 87 ] •

The findings of these studies were

indeed quite negative.
In the Herschell Committee Report 'I-Te f.ind the following conclusion:
0

Upon the whole we cannot see any evidence that the effect

of a falline exchange on the country at large, in influencing either
exports or imports, has over a series of years been very considerable."
[ 51 ]

And from the subsequent Fowler Committee the following equally
strong conclusion emerged:
iiwe desire to state that ue have been unable to find any
statistical support for the theory that exports are largely and perman
ently stimulated by a depreciation of the standard of value, resulting
in a fall in the exchange." [39]
These conclusions are indeed sufficiently strong to demand some
explanation if the rough reodel sketched above is to be given any credence.
Each one of these c,mmittees, cJmmissions or studies presented findings
particular to the sin~le country concerned an1 hence to a certain extent
the empirical eviden::e presented would have to be examined in detail
on a country by country basis -- a(~aek of excessive m~gnitude for a
study of ffiis scope.
see that the kinds

of

Fortunately, in reading through them one can easily
arguments presented in support;/ •of ··their conclusions

were largely the same for ea.ch of these studies arid hence tlie- :,;al'.idfty
of their conclusions can be evaluated in terms

of

the logic of their

arguments which can be sumfu.arized and crii.ticized as foiiows:
(l)
·"

First , it wS:s contended in several of those countries that

-11-

imports grew faster than exports 9 .

While in the static sense alone this

should indeed be the antithesis of the expected effect of currency
depreciation on the balance of payments, which would presumably be to
assist exports and promote import substitution, in ~he dynamic context
(which would seem to be relevant to a period as long as two decades) the
~apital goods and perhaps, raw material and intermediate inputs for the
growing and shifting productive capacity would have to be imported. Hence
the alleged finding would be entirely possible and, in fact, indicative
of a successful beginning for a take off into rapid economic development.
The ext e.l"nal deficit (Imports - Exports) is, of course, net foreign
investment.Starting from either an external equilbrium or a deficit, the
fact that imports are growing faster than exports means that some' imports,
probably capital goods imports, are being obtained in return for IOU's
or claims on domestic assets of various kinds.

When foreign capital

is induced into the depreciating country over a period of years on an
en increasing scale, it would certainly not seem justifiable to record
this as evidence of harm brought about by the depreciation of the currency.
Indeed it would seem more appropriate to interpret this as evidence
of a healthy state of expanding investment opportunities and of capital
accumulation and growth!
9This argument was stated most strongly and relied on most heavily

by Remer [ 89 ] but in other studies as well (Ray [ 86 ]). Actually
evidence presented elsewhere by Remer, himself, [87,88 suggests that such
a finding at least in the case of China may indeed have been a statistical
aberration brough about by (1) an increasing tendency to underinvoice
exports which were subject to export taxes of increasiqg severity due to
their emphasis on specific taxes in periods of falling export prices
(2) the omission of all trade in Chinese transport ships (mainly junks)
carrying on a reportedly brisk and growing trade with neighboring count
ries and (3) the lag in the exchange rate used to convert gold currency
to Chinese silver currency by the customs houses behind current rates
of exchange.

-12-

(2) :rt was pointed out that exports of the silver countries to other
countries had in some instances grown as fast or almost as fast as had
their exports to gold standard countries .

Since all si.lver countries

were during the depreciat ion of silver 1mplicit1- y devaluati ng at
identical rates with respect to gold standard countries but, therefore ,
not with respect to each other, such an outcome was said to imply that
the observed increase in exports should be attribute d to factors other
10
than the depreciat ion of silver • However, by reference to Figure 2,
the reader will be able to see that increased exports to other silver
countries would indeed be a l.ikely consequen ce of devaluati on.

In this

nd
diagram DA a DB represent the domestic demand curves for certain export
ables in silver countries A and B, respectiv ely, and SAand SB represent
At the initial exchange rate the foreign (gold

their supply curves,

standard countries, ) supply and/or demand curve in terms of domestic
currency (silver pesos) is given by SRWI and A's consumpti on is given
by CAl and B's by CBl'

A produces SAl a~d imports (CAl - SAl) from the

gold countries (SRWl). Bis entirely an importer.

However, when the

two silver countries devaluate by P1P2 with respect to gold countries ,
OP

1

the foreign supply (demand) curve shifts upward to SRW2 , A's consumpti on
falls to cA 2 and B's to cB2 • A's productio n increases to sA2 while
B's increases from zero to sB2 , and B will become a likely supplier of
A's imports (cA2 - sA2 ) as well as an exporter to the gold countries
(the rest of the world) of [ ( sB2 -

CB2 )' ~••.cA2 .:. S~;-)].

It would be easy to construct a case in which the increase in trade
between A and B would exceed the increase in trade of A and B with the
rest of the world.

This case would be especiall y likely to arise if

SA would shift inward over time as external diseconom ies set in or
10 See Ray

]
(86] and the Herschell Committee (51.
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-13technological change lags behind that in other sectors (as its
effective market for A's suppliers dwindles) and/or if SB would
shift outward over time as each country tends to move in the direction
of its comparative advantage.

The inducement to trade among the various

devaluating countries would be further enhanced if DA and DB shift
outward over time as a result of rising incomes in the devaluating
countries.
Since many of the silver countries enjoyed feographical proximity
to each other {grouped as they were almost exclusively in Asia and in
Latin America) and since ample evidence will be presented that the
silver countries were growing more rapidly (and hence their demand

curves were shifting out over time more rapidly) than were the gold
countries, it would not be surprising to find trade among silver
countries growing
ard countries.

at least as rapidly as between silver and gold stand

Therefore, rather than being interpreted as an

indication the weakness of the devaluation effect,

a rate of growth

in exports of silver countries to other silver countries equal to
that of the exports of silver countries to gold countries should more
appropriately be interpreted as evidence of the strength and healthiness
of this effect -- a customs union -- creating effect with the bonus
of also stimulating extra regional exports,
(3)

Almost all of these studies pointed out individual years of

extremely depreciated rates and poor export performance and/or vice
versa.

However, when very short periods of time are involved, the

effects of exchange rate changes could be (and often were) swamped by the
effects of weather, war, disease and internal insurrection and hence this
kind of evidence is hardly very convincing.

Even when the growth rates

of different short periods of time are compared, as in Lin [ 67 ], the

-14the time lags involved between investment, and output, and export would
seem to make the usefulness of this kind of evidence most dubious.

(4) A charge frequently made against devaluation in the present
context was that exchange rate fluctuations were both a necessary
consequence of devaluation and a serious evil.

While fluctuations

in exchange rates may have been a characteristic associated with the
general depreciation of silver during the period under investigation,
there is no reason to think that exchange rate fluctuation is a necessary
consequence of exchange rate devaluation.
t.ethodological shortcomings, MacBean [

Furthermore~ despite some

68] has presented some results

which suggest that the case against fluctuations or instability of
various kinds may not be as strong as it was once thought to be,

(5) In some of the countries it was alleged that export prices
were falling more rapidly than import prices and that this implied
both a terms of trade loss attributable to devaluation and made it
unlikely that an increase in export supply could be induced without
resorting to coercion.

However, Machlup [ 69 ], Tsiang [ 98 ] and

others suggest that the terms of trade effect is neither the only nor the
most important consequence of devaluation and that a terms of trade a
deterioration may not be independent of other (beneficial) effects of
devaluation.

Furthermore, while the implication may hold for a naive

two-commodity world, it would certainly not hold for a more realistic
three-commodity world, in which, in addition to imports ~nd exports, there
is a home goods sector.

It is precisely home goods prices that would be

expected to fall more rapidly than either export or import prices as a
result of devaluation.

It is therefore quite possible, and in fact

highly likely, that the rise in export prices re~ative to home goods
would be sufficient. to induce greater export supplv even· if

--..,'. ·.

~

were falling more rapidly than import prices.
(6)

It has been asserted that several of these silver standard

countries were able to expand their exports at almost the same rate even
after they had switched from to silver to gold.

Such was evidently the

case for India from the time of the switch to gold in the mid 1890's to
World War I.

Ray [

86 ] and Keynes [ -5,9 ] have used such an argument

to belittle the importanc e of the depreciat ion om silver in the 18r41894 period.

What these authors fail to realize is that, unlike the

earlier period, the 1895 - World War I period was one of stable silver
11
prices and rising export prices aand hence would have been expected
to have had much the same effect on the supply of exports as devaluati on
in the previous period.
When one compares the findings of, the compositi on of and the
kinds of witnesses called by several of these commissions (favorabl e
and unfavorab le to the effect of devaluati on on economic growth), it
becomes easy to suspect the objectivi ty of some of their findings
Leavens [ 62] has pointed out the heavY influence exerted by importers
and underrepr esentatio n of exporters in the Indian commissio ns which is
in sharp contrast to the experienc e in Ceylon (Gunaseke ra [ 48 ]).
Ingram [ 53 ] reported the excessive influence and national istic
prejudice s of foreign advisors in the case of Thailand.

Gunaseker a [ 48 ]

pointed out that the British personnel of the commissions and their
staffs were biased against depreciat ing exchange by their own personal
desires to make sterling remittanc es from their fixed rupee salaries to
their families and banks in Great Britain.

It might be more than

a coinciden ce that all of the "native" minority in the Singapore
11

~e price of ba~. silver in London was ·28.94 pence per ounce in 1894
and 28.03 in·1912, according to the Committee for the Study of Silver
Values and Commodity Prices [23, pp. 3-4]. Lewis' price index of
Primary exports rose from 73 in 1894-6 to 100 in 1913 [64, pp.117-8] .

-16Chamber of Commerce favored retentio n of silver (Kemmerer [ 57 , p. 394])
and that "native" particip ation was reduced in the subsequ ent Straits
. . 11
Settlement s Monet rry Commiss
ion
Also it would appear that Indians
were not only totally excluded from the delibera tions of the Hersche ll
and Fowler committ ees but also were not even permitte d to present
their views to the members of these committe es -- committe es which
.
pro d uce d cone 1 usions
. t ion
. 12 .
negat.ive t o exch ange deprecia

On the basis of these various kinds of shortcom ings and logical
non-seq uitors in the studies which pur~orte d to deny the existenc e of a
favorab le relation ship between exchange devalua tion and economic growth,
a new look at the evidenc e-focusi ng more on compara tive long term
trends and growth performa nce -- would seem Justifie d.

IV A COMPARISON OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE ~N GOLD, SILVER AND
PAPER CURRENCY COUNTRIES1
In this and the followin g section we shall attempt to estimate
the effect.'.'. of exchange rate devalua tion on economic developm ent by
comparin g the export performa nce (and subsequ ently other growth indicato rs)
of silver standard countrie s (and to a certain extent other devalua ting
countrie s l-:hich were on an inconve rtible paper currency } with that of
gold standard countrie s.

Euoh comparis ons would, of course, yield

reliable estimate s of the impact of continuo us devalua tion on economic
a.evelopment only

if·"othe r factors" did not differ between countrie s.

As usual history does not readily provide us with such a nice
opportu nity for a controll ed experime nt',
11The
12

~he geograph y, resourc e,

source of this statemen t in Kemmerer [ 57 , p. 394-7]

Ibid, p. 13

13Through
out this paper gold-exc hange standard countrie s and silver
exchange countrie s will be treated as identica l to gold standard and
silver standard countrie s.

-17endowments, the social and economic institu tions and the level and
momentum of development inherit ed from the past, of course ,
from country to c-:,untry.

However, the rather large sample of countr ies

of each type permits compar isons (at least on a, iimi ted basis) o:f".:sub
samples of silver and gold standar d countr ies in which other factors
are fairly simila r.

Since, as mention ed in the previou s section , it was

quite comm n for those opposed to exchang e deprec iation to attribu te
export growth and overal l economic develop emnt to "other factors ", it is
import ant that we take note at the outset of some of the more pervasi ve
of these other influen ces.
First, and perhaps foremo st among these other influen ces was
the openlng up of the Suez Canal in 1869.

The time and cost saving

in shippin g between the Orient and Europe was consid erable, In as much
14
as most of the Asian countr ies were on the silver standa rd at the
time of the Suez Canal opening , the tilvcr etend.t. rd countr ies we~e
probab ly more favorab ly influen ced by the Suez Canal. than were the gold
countr ies.

However, French possess ions in India and the Dutch East

Indies were also on gold and thus provide a more fair basis of compar
ison with the severa l silver countr ies of Asia.

In other parts of

the world, notably in Latin Americ a, there were a number of countr ies on
15
both silver and gold • Further more, since the Suez Canal was opened
14 India, Ceylon , Japan, Korea, Indoch ina, the Phillip pin:s, Thailan d,
the Malayan states , Straits Settlem ents and China were all on silver
through out this period .
15 Bolivi a, the Centra l American countr ies (Costa Rica, El Salvad or,
Guatem ala, Honduras and Nicarag ua) , Ecuado r, Mexico and Peru were on
silver while Argent ina, and Chile were on deprec iating paper and Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Venezu ela, Urugua y, the British , Dutch and French West
Indies and Guianas were on gold.

-18as early as 1869 -- an event which could easily be anticipated well
in advance -- whereas the depreciation of silver did not start on a
significant scale until 1874 (the beginning date for our investigation)~
much of the Suez Canal effect was probably realized prior to the
period under investigation.
A second and closely related factor was the development of steam
boats which, like the Suez Canal opening, resulted in lower shipping
rates. The effect of the steamboat innovation was undoubtedly felt
only more gradually and therefore was less likely to have been fully
realized prior to the beginning of the period under investigation

(1874-1894).

On the other hand, it is much less likely that the fall

in shipping costs would have favored any one group of countries more
than another.

If anything, one might suspect that the countries most

distant from their main markets, most notably the gold standard countries
of Oceania and South Africa, would have benefitted most significantly
from this development.
A third factor of considerable importance was the importance of
11
the "opening up" and "peace-making powers which the colonial powers

exercised on an increasing scale in many of the colonial areas during
the period and the not inconsiderable investments made in transport
facilities and other forms of social overhead capital.

This factor

undoubtedly did much to promote trade in the areas affected. However,
once again, there is no reason to think that the silver standard colonies
gained to any greater extent than the gold standard countries on this
account. There were also many examples of silver and gold countries which
had already obtained their independence and thus where this and other
effects (both desirable and undesirable) of colonial status were absent,
.Another factor which might have biased the results considerably if
it differed significantly between countries is trade policy.

There is
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some indica tion that both export and import tax rates fell over the period
in
many countr ies--at least until the 1890vs --but there is no reason to believe
that the changes are more noticea ble in the devalu ating countr ies than
in the
gold countr ies.

Actual ly trade liberal ization was probab ly weakes t in the

deprec iating paper countr ies.

However, as noted in the introdu ction, the

period under investi gation was charac terized by relativ ely free trade
and
quanti tative restric tions on trade (with the excepti on of restric ting
on
. a f ew countr . )
spec i e movements in
. stent. 16
ies were a 1most nonexi

Still another major "outsid e: 1 influen ce was the trend in commodity prices.
Althoug h one cannot be very precise for want of reliabl e and relevan t
sta
tistics , there is evidenc e of great divers ity in price trends even though
almost all prices were falling over the period .

Some prices (such as those

of copperp rice, various cereals , sugar, and cotton) fell much more rapidly
than the price of silver, wherea s the prices of some commo dities (e.g.,
tobacco , animal s, meat, dairy produc ts, machin ery, coal, wine, lumber
and
of course gold) decline d to a consid erably smaller degree than the price
of
silver,

Althoug h the two decade period under investi eation should be suf

ficien tly long to permit countr ies to depart signifi cantly from their
tra
ditiona l export bundle s, the high degree of produc t concen tration in the
exports of a large number of countr ies--bo th silver and gold--a nd the
long
gestati on period between plantin gs and output in a number of these produc
ts
make it likely that the varying world market conditi ons for the countr
y's
base period export bundle could have accoun ted for conside rably differe
nt
pattern s of export perform ance over the period .

Natura lly, countr ies, where

export prices were falling more rapidly than the average , would be affecte
d
16

see J.B. Condli ffe [ 24] •

]•

17
The price
.
i nd exes re f erred to are t h e

wh o1esa 1 e pr i ce i ndices f or t h e

-20-

adversely in comparison with countries whose export prices were falling less
rapidly.

Unfortunately, the lack of detailed volume and price statistics

for exports during the period for all but a few countries makes it impos
sible to test the importance of relative differences in world market con
ditions of different commodity bundles in explaining differences
performance in any systematic or comprehensive way.

in export

There would seem to

be every indication that on the whole the export prices of gold standard
countries did not fall as rapidly as those of silver standard countries.

18

Therefore, the omission of such differences in the overall comparison of
the export performance of silver and gold countries, which is to follow,
will bias the results against the hypothesis that continuous devaluation is
conducive to export growth and economic development.
Finally, it should be admitted that, despite general peace in the
world between the mid-1870's and the mid-1890's, there were some small wars,
internal rebellions

revolutions, droughts, floods, disease epidemics and

various other exogenous factors which may have affected individual countries
considerably but not silver, gold or paper countries as a whole.

Therefore

in what follows, we shall present the evidence we have been able to accumu
late to date in such a way as to compare the overall experience of the de
preciating silver standard and paper standard countries with that of gold
17 (continued)
] and scattered
U.S. available in U.S. Bureau of the Census [ 104]
sources
national
various
of
indices
price
import
and
series of export
utilized below.
· 18rhis may or may not be an indication of a terms of trade loss for
the silver countries attributable to devaluation. Imlah's careful
of the British terms of trade during this period found no
study (52]
of currency appreciation for Great Britain.
influence
positive
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standard countries leaving it to the reader to make his own comparisons of
individual countries which he feels may be most comparable.

If anything,

this simplification probably biases the results against our hypothesis.
Thereby we relegate the consideration of various of these Fother factors" to
the explanation of some of the larger deviations from group norms (i.e., the
mean growth rates for gold and silver countries) rather than for explaining
the more fundamental intergroup differences.

4.

Export Performance of the Gold Standard Countries

In Tables 2 and 3 we present aggregate merchandise exports, as mea
sured in gold currencies, for each of the colonies of Great Britain and
France, respectively, that were effectively on the gold standard.

(Several

of the other British colonies--Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, the Malayan
states, Ceylon and India--were on silver standards.

Of the French colonies
In

only Indochina remained on silver until the end of the 19th century.)

Table 4 appear the corresponding export statistics in the appropriate gold
currency of other gold standard countries including some of the more highly
developed economies and the colonies of Holland and Spain.

Unfortunately,

the statistics of the French colonies are not comparable with those of
Tables 2 and 4 in as much as they cover a somewhat shorter period.

On

an aggregate basis we have interpolated the figures back to 1876 on the
basis of the colonies exports to France, alone, between 1876 and 1880.

If

the statistics were available on a comparable basis back to the early
1870's, it is conceivable that a slight growth in the gold value of exports
would have been revealed instead of the significant decline in their ex
ports which is shown in Table 3.

But it would seem quite unlikely that the

-22Table 2
Merchandise Exports of the British Colonies
1
on the Gold Standard in Millions of British~
1871-1875 Average

Colony
Mauritius
Labuan
Falkland Islands
Natal
Cape of Go9d Hope
St. Helena
7
Lagos (Nigeria)
Gold Coast
Sierra Leone
Gambia
Canada
Newfoundland
Bermuda
British Honduras
Bahamas
Turk's Island
Jamaica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Barbados
Grenada
Tobago
British Virgin Islands
St. Christopher
Nevis
Antigua
Montserrat
Dominica
Trinidad
British Guiana
Malta9
Australia
New Zealand

2.584
.095
.039
.590
4.013
.029
.487
.317
.020
.1388
17.211
1.303
.064
.222
.919
.023
1,288
,160
.217
.928
.153
.070
.500

.161
.060
.171
.034
.068
1.152
2.538
8,205
17 .880
3.380

1894-1896 Average
1.579
.055
.129
.758
7.800
.001
• 776
.698
.018
.0812
24.659
1.191
,098
.176
.1233
.027
1.669
.109
.071
.581
.181
.010
.010
.334

(5.315>7

4

1.379
1.3215
5.0006
30.500
7.844

Total
64.525
87,168
Index 1894-6 (1871-5=100) = 135.1
Does not include Fiji Islands, Gibraltar, British Borneo, Zanzibar, Britis~
East Africa, Cyprus, British New Guinea, for which data was not available
and/or were not under British control in one of the periods.
2 Includes Northwest territories which was not part of Dominion of Canada in
1871-5 period.
3rncludes Caico Islands which were not included in earlier figures,
5Estimated from British import data.

le
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Table 2 (continued)
6

Includes Northern territories not included in the earlier period.
7rncludes bullion and specie exports.

8

1872-76 average.
9May include some reexports.
Sources:

(1) For all colonies except Australia: United Kingdom, Board of
Trade [101].
(2) For Australia: N.G. Butlin [14, Table 247, p. 410).

-23Table 3
Merchand ise Exports of the French Colonies on the Gold
Standard 1876-80 to 1893-95
(in millions of French francs)
1880
1876-1880
Average

To Other
Countries

to France

to France

To Other
French
Colonies

Martiniqu e

22.4

24.5

.6

8.8

33.9

Guadaloup e

19.8

20.7

.2

10.0

30.9

.4

.5

.1

.6

Reunion

22.6

18.1

.4

5.1

23.5

Senegal

12.9

19.8

3.6

1.9

25.3

French India

6.1

11.1

1.2

13.2

25.4

St. Pierre et Miquelon

8.5

7.6

1.8

2.3

Madagasca r

3.3
.81

3.5

3.0

.8

2.5

3.3

2.4
n.a.

2.4
1.44
5.2

Colony

French Guinea

Tahiti

New Caledonia
Gabon

11.7

1

n.a.

n.a.

?

?

?

?

106.6

7.8

49.3

Other French West
Africa
Total (excludin g
French West Africa and
Indochina )

n.a.

96.8

1893-5 Index (1876=100 ):

95.6

Total

6.5

1

5

1
Estimated
2

1892 only.

3

are not identical because of rounding error and because a
breakdown of exports by destinati on is not available for Gabon.
, column and row totals

4
1881 data
51aao total has been interpola ted back to 1876 on the basis of the French import
statistic s 1876-80.
Source: France, Hinistere and Colonies [41].

-24Table 3 (continued)

Colony

To France

1893-5
To Other
To Other
French
CounColonies
tries

Total

Martinique

20.1

.5

1.3

21.9

Gusdaloupe

15.4

.5

.2

16.1

.2

9.4

French Guinea

9.2

Reunion

15.8

.2

.9

16.9

Senegal

12.5

.1

3.7

16.3

French India

10.8

.3

7.9

19.0

6.3

1.4

2.5

10.2

2.0

.2

2.4

4.6

.2

.2

2.7

3.1

4.9

7.4

n.a.

3.1

St. Pierre et IYliquelon
t1adagascar
Tahiti
New Caledonia
Gabon

2.5
n.a.

Othe:: French West Africa
Total (e2::cluding French
West Africa and
Indochina)
1893-5 Inde}: (1876=100)

n.a.

5.2

94.85
95.6

3.4

13.0

18.2

26.7

128.0

Notes:
1
2

EsUmated.
1892 o:::1ly.

3

Colu~n nnd row totals are not identical because of rounding error and because
a breakdown of exports by destination is not available for Gabon.
4
1881 date,.
C:

J1830 total has been interpolated back to 1876 on the basis of the French import
statistica 1876-80.
Source:

France, Hinistere and Colonies [41].

-25Table 4
Exports of Other Gold Standard Countries and Colonies
Country
Algeria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cuba
Denmark
Dutch East
Indie:b
Egypt

Units
million
million
million
million
million

1872-5 Average

1
148.5
francs
francs
2.112
crowns
50.43
gold pesos 88.0
154.0
kroner

5
112.0
million florins
million Egyptian
13.6
pounds
85.0
million marks
Finland
3,78
billion francs
France
2.4
million marks
Germany
million gourdes
Haiti
10.03
1006.0
million lira
Italy
516.0
Netherlands million florins
kroner
million
Norway
110.05
130.4
million francs
Portugal
215.0
million kroner
Sweden
United
243.7
million pounds
Kingdom
United
7
million dollars
States
569.08
Uruguay 14 million gold pesos 15.7
million gold
Venezuela
76.8
bolivars
All countries combined Index (1872-5=100)
1
1873-5
2
1894-6

1892-5 Average

1892-5 Index
1872-5=100)

2

171.0
128.6
154.8
128.4
137.0

11

129.7

135.0
4.40
3.110
12.24
972.6
1177 .o
123.06
136.7
313.0

95.6
158.8
116.4
129.2
122.0
96.7
228.1
111.8
104.8
145.6

221.7

91.0

254.04
2.7
78.0
113.0
211.0
223.0
13.0

5

793.09
26.8

139.4
170.7

98.7

128.5
134.4

8
1872-4
9
1891-3
'l
10
"'1874-5
1893-4
4
11
1891-5
1895
5
12
1875
1881 only
6
13 Egypt had a bimetallic standard
1892
71874
until 1885
14Although nominally on a silver standard
Venezuela after 1877 prohibited imports of silver currency. repeatedly coined
new gold coins and according to Ramon Veloz Economia y Finanzas de Venezuela
Des de 1831 Hasta 1944~ Vol. 41,
Caracas, Impresos Unidos, 1945 the bolivar remained at a rate of approximately
to the British pound throughout the period.
25 bolivars

-26Table 4 (continued)
Sources:

Algeria: [2,

Belgium:

Belgium, Statistique de la Belgique [8, 1892, p. IX and 1896, p, V].

Bulgaria:
Cuba:

1873-5, p, 279 and 1894-6, pp. 209-211).

Bulgaria [11, p. XIII].

Friedlaender [43] and Porter [84].
Henriksen and Olgaard [50, p. 40),

Denmark:

Dutch East Indies:
Egypt:

Furnivall [44, p. 129, 169, 171, 207, 337, 338],

Head [71, Table 6, p. 267].
Frederiksen [42, pp. 153-4).

Finland:

France, Direction Generale de Douanes [40, 1875, p, XXIV and 1896, p. XXXVII].

France:

United States? National Monetary Commission [106, p. 153].

Germany:
Haiti:

Bulletin of the American Republics [12, Vol, 2).

Italy:

Clough [21] and Italy, Ministerio Della Finanze [55, 1879, p. 304].
Netherlands [76, 1896, pp. 135-6).

Netherlands:
Norway:

Norway [77, 1881, p. 57 and 1894, p. 68).
Harvand [ 70] •

Portugal:
Sweden:

Institute for Social Sciences, University of Stockholm (96, Vol. III 11 p. 584].

United Kingdom:
United States:
Uruguay:
Venezuela:

Imlah [52, p. 97).
U.S. Bureau of the Census [104].

Uruguay [108] and Acevedo [1, pp. 38-43 and 85-104].
Venezuela [110, Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 34-5].

i
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export value of the French colonies could have grown as rapidly as the other
countries.
The average gold standard country--rich or poor, British or French, Dutch
or Spanish, Asian, African, etc.--would seem to have achieved a growth in the
value of exports of, '- only about 30 percent in more than twenty years--an annual rate of growth of barely 1 percent per annum.

It must be remembered

that, with world prices falling steadily at about 2 percent per year over the
period, in real terms the increase in exports would be somewhat higher.

Never

theless, it should be quite clear that the picture was hardly a very exciting
one.

The value of exports in no fewer than 28 different gold standard coun

tries or colonies actually declined during this period of more than twenty
years!

While it is tru.2. that exports grew moderately rapidly in some of the

larger and more important colonies such as the Cape of Good Hope, Algeria,
Australia, New Zeal.end~ the Netherlantfs and some of the newer colonial terri
tories of Natal, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Gabon, Guinea, and New Caledonia,
in almost all of these cases the growth of exports could be largely attributed
to certain very unusual .::dvantages.

The nopening-up 11 effect was probably

of utTiost i~portance in the yery early stages of colonization in New Zealand,
Nigeria, Australia, all of the other African colonies and New Caledonia.
Expecially favorable export price mcvements undoubtedly also played a role,
e.g., in the c,s.se of New Zealand (gold, dairy products, meat) the Nether
lands (dairy produ~ts), South Africa and Natal (meat, gold, coal) and
Uruguay (meat and sheepskins).

The technological innovation of refrigera

tion and refrigerated cargo sh:tps in the 1880's probably contributed greatly
to the growth of dairy and meat exports from Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay,
Sou.th Africa, the Scandin;:J.vian countries and the Netherlands.

As mentioned
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above, the speed and cost improvements in shipping would also have favored
the countries most distant from their principal markets in Western Europe-
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the sub-Saharan African colonies
and New Caledonia.

Furthermore, the more rapidly growing countries also had

rapidly growing populations so that in per capita terms exports were falling
21 C da and pro bbly
20
19
l
most of t1e
a
ana
Austra 1·1a,
d
New Zea1an,
i n Uruguay,
African colonies.

B.

Export Performance of Silver and Paper Countries
Statistics on aggregate exports are unfortunately much scarcer for

silver and paper countries and there are a number of such countries for which
it has been impossible to find any export data.

In Tables 5 and 6 we pre

sent what statistics we have been able to find for silver and paper coun
tries, respectively.

In order to be as comparable as possible with the

data presented for the gold standard countries, all statistics have been
presented in terms of a gold currency or in a silver currency deflated by
the price index of silver in terms of gold from Table 1.

As the notes and

sources indicate, the statistics have been obtained from widely scattered
sources and, therefore, it would seem only fair to warn the reader that the
figures p~esented in these tables are undoubtedly less reliable than those
presented in the previous tables.
19

20

In addition, the years for which we were

See Hanson [49].

see Simkin [94a] and Condliffe [25].
Indeed Condliffe presents a series of per capita exports in constant prices
which drop more than 50 percent between 1871 and 1895!
21 see N.G. Butlin
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Table 5
Exports of Silver Standard Countries and Colonies
1872-5 Average

Country

Units

Bolivia1

tons of tin exports

Ceylon

million British pounds

China

million HK tael deflated by
exchange rate index

Costa Rica

million dollars (US)

Ecuador

million dollars (US)

3.1

million dollars (US)

India

million rupees deflated by
exchange rate index
1892-3
million yen deflated by
exchange rate index

Japan
Korea
Malaya 10

Philippines

12

Salvador
Straits sI
tlements

6-

million dollars (US) con
verted by exchange rate
of Mexican pesos to
dollars

60.l

316.3

20.6

332.2

2.7

385.7

22.5

25,S.7

19.2
5.815

10(}.0

9

67.4

17Q.6

9.0 9

24.2

27.5 5

92.6

8.8 5

39.5

million francs

Average of the individual country indices

17

456.2

million silver dollars
deflated by exchange
rate index

Vietnam and
Indo China

4916.7

14.6

million dollars (US)

million bhat deflated by
exchange rate index

6

19.0

19.2
2.814

Thailand

1.2

llQil
25~.4

108.0

3.2 9

million sols deflated by
exch'lnge rate index

5.3

4

607.3

million silver dollars
deflated by exchange
rate index

Peru

122.• 2

562.5

.06

million dollars (US)

4.4

26.5

10.1

million yen deflated by
exchange rate index

Nicaragua

not app).icable

232.2
262.4

7

million silver dollars
deflated by exchange
rate index

Mexico

1893-6 tndex
(1872-5~100)

1800 3

76.6

69.6

2.1 5

Guatemala

1893-6 Average

207.1

336.7

244,. a17
!
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Table 5 (continued)
Notes:
1
Virtually no export data is available for Bolivia for this period due to the
fact that its exports move by land through Argentina, Chile, Peru and Para
guay to shipping ports. However, all references that could be uncovered in
dicated this was a boom period for Bolivia despite territorial losses and
financial stress resulting from the war with Chile 1880-1.
2
1880
31890
4For 1895 only. China's exports during the year were hampered by war and the
loss of Formosa.
51883
6

1893-5 average.
71883 figure in silver pesos converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of exchange
rate for that year.
8
1896-9 average.
91871-4 average.
lOTin exports only.
111871 converted on the basis of exchange rate of that year.
12According to Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Modern Currency Reforms, N.Y. MacMillan
Co., 1916 after 1877-80 imports of foreign silver currency were prohibited in
an effort to maintain the silver price and hence the exchange rate of domestic
currency (pesos) in terms of gold currencies in the face of the falling world,
The extent to which the authorities were successful in this
price of silver.
respect is not clear as information on local or "black market'' exchange rates
for that period are not available. Benito Legarda, Jr., makes no mention of
exchange restriction s in "Economic Change and Entrepreneu rship in the Nine
teenth-Cent ury Philippines ," Ph.D. dissertatio n, Harvard University, 1955,
To the extent that the exchange rate (in pesos per dollar) was kept below the
N.Y. rates of silver pesos per dollar, the dollar figure for 1892-5 under
estimates the true dollar figure and at the same time would account for the
comparative ly slower growth in Philippine exports with respect to other silver
standard countries.
13

1877-8
141875
15 1895 converted on basis of exchange rate of that year.
16Foreign trade only.
17 Korea and Bolivia have been excluded.

-31Table 5 (continued)
Sources:
Bolivia: Bulletin of the American Republics [12, Vol. 4, pp. 612].
Ceylon: United Kingdom, Board of Trade, [101, Part XV, 1871-5, p. 45 and
Part XXII, 1894-6, p. 69].
China: Cheng [18, p. 258] and China (19, 1883 and 1896].
Costa Rica: Guell [47], and Bulletin of the American Republics[l2, Vol. 3, p. 692).
Ecuador: Carbo [16, especially p. 447].
Guatemala: Alan Cohen [22], Young [115] and Bulletin of American Republic (12,
Vol. 4, p. 1011].
India: Ray [86].
Japan: Baba and Tatemoto (5, Table 6-2, p. 167].
Korea: Paul W. Kuznets[60, Table 1, p. 24].
Malaya: Van Ooms (unpublished statistics prepared for a study of the Malayan
economy).
l':iexico: Mexico [72, p. 75 and p. 153].
Nicaragua: Levy [63] and Bureau of the American Republics, [13, Bulletin No. 6,
May 1891, p. 103].
Peru: Peru [81, 82], Dunn [32], and Peru (83, p. 32].
Philippines: United States, Bureau of the Census (103, Vol, IV, pp. 564-5].
El Salvador: Bureau of the American Republics (13, p. 116], and El Salvador,
Direccion General de Estadistica [35].
Straits Settlements: Van 0oms (unpublished statistics prepared for a study
of the Malayan economy).
Thailand~ Ingram [53, pp. 240-241].

-32Table 6
Exports of Countries with Inconvertible Paper Currencies

Argentina
(millions of U.S. dollars)

1892-6
Index
(1870-5=100)

1892-6
Average

1870-5
Average

Country

42.5

106.7

251.1

775.0

110.0

Austria-Hungary
(millions of golden
[stable gold])
Brazil (millions of b)
Chile (million pesos [gold])
Colombia (millions of U.S.
dollars)
Greece (million francs)
Paraguay (millions of U.S.
dollars)

704.6

9

92.0

170.9

31.1

18.2
1

153.0

2

3

255.7

37.7 7

258.4

9.7

1.811

Russia (millions of rubles,
gold)

339.2

Spain (milU.ons of pesetas
[gold])

490.0

2.912

5

134.5
666.9

Average of the Individual Indices for the Above Countries
11874 on1y.
21894 only.
31871-3 only.
4
1891 only.
51871-5 only.

166.3

136.1
184.4

6

1891-1894.
7
1869-70.
8
1890 converted from drachmas to franc§
on basis of average exchange rate
91883-5 average.
10

colombia was on the gold standard until 1886.
11
1881-3 average.
12
1890-1 only

Sources:

Argentina: National Association of Manufactures [75].
Austria-Hungary: Austria-Hungary [4, 1886, p. 171 and 1896, p. 207].
Brazil: Brazil [10].
Chile: Fetter [38].
Colombia: Garcia [45].
Greece: Tumlir [99, p. 197].
Paraguay: De Bourgade la Dardye [28] and Schurz (92).
Russia: Willis [114].
Spain: Vives [112].
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able to obtain data does not correspond in many of the cases to those of the
previous tables,

However, in general the time spen covered by Tables 5 and

6 is shorter than that of the previous tables and hence is likely to under
state the trueexport growth of silver and paper standard countries over
the two decade period between the early 1870 9 s and middle 1890's.
Despite these and other shortcomings of the statistics, the figures
should be sufficient to demonstrate that the export performance of both the
paper and especially the silver standard countries was radically different
from that of the gold standard countries,

As the average indexes presented

in Tables 5 and 6 indicate, th9 average silver standard country's exports
increased 144.8 percent and the average country on inconvertible paper cur
rency (most of which were devaluating with respect to gold) increased its
exports by 84.4 percent. 22

Thus, exports in the average silver country in-

creased by more than 4 percent per annum or more than four times the growth
of exports in gold standard countries!

In contrast to the 28 gold standard

countries or colonies whose exports fell in value terms, there i s ~ evi
dence that any silver or paper country experienced a decline in the (gold)
23
value of its exports.

22

It has not been possible to weight the individual countries in the
aggregate index by the size of exports (or any other appropriate weighting
factor) due to lack of consistent and reliable information of exchange rates
between the different silver and gold currencies. If weights had been
applied it is quite conceivable that the weighted average index would show a
somewhat smaller rate of growth in exports since some of the big countries
(India, China and the Philippines) had the slowest growth rates of the coun
tries in this group, However, since other large exporters (Japan and Mexico)
were among the best performers, since Korea, the best performer, was not
included and because as explained in footnote 12 of Table 5 exports of the
Philippines for the 1890 1 s are undoubtedly understated, the exaggeration of
the overall rate of growth of exports of silver countries is probably not great.
23
If earlier sta.tistics had been used for Peru, they would have shown a
decline but only because Peru lost territory in its war with Chile which pro
duced the bulk of its eY.ports prior to 1880.
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The variation in export growth even among silver countries is of course
quite substantial.

However, most of the more significant differences can be

roughly accounted for by the other factors mentioned above.

For example,

the extremely rapid growth reported for Korea must certainly be largely at
tributable to the nopening upi; forced upon Korea in 1876 by Japan which
radically changed this country that had formerly been characterized
nhermit kingdom. n

as

The law and order effect of British influence undoubtedly

had much to do with Malaya's performance.

Hexico's impressive performance

was probably assisted by the abolition of the "alcabala,"or transit tax im
posed by individual states a.ud municipalities on trade between regions and
towns within Mexico (Limantour [66]).
On the other hand, the seemingly poor performance of the Philippine
Islands can be explained as follows:

first, as explained in footnote 12 of

Table 5, the authorities evidently tampered with the exchange rate after
1880 in a deliberate effort to prevent the implicit devaluation, and thus
the Philippines should perhaps not be classified as a silver country in the
same sense.

Second, to the extent the authorities succeeded in this effort,

the dollar figures for exports of the 1890's,which have been arrived at by
conversion of original pesos to c~ollars, at the New York
rate quoted for conversion of Nexican peso to dollar undoubtedly seriously
understate the true dollar value of Philippine exports for that period.
Third, a somewhat below average pe~formance would be expected on the basis
of the fact that the prices of two of its major export commodities (sugar
and abaca) fell considerably more rapidly than world prices in general.
1'1oreover, according to Stephe!l Resnick's unpublished worksheets, Philippine
exports grew in real terms between 1875 and 1893 at a rate of more than
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4.5 percent per annum regardless of whether 1857 or 1893 weights are used.
This record would establish this period as the second or third greatest boom
period in recorded Philippine history!
While India ohowed only e.n 8 percent increase in value terms, it is
quite clear that expo~ts were booming in real terms.
export products

24

Using the 11 largest

for which volume and value data are provided in Ray

to compute an aggregate volume index, we have found the rate of growth of
these Indian exports in real terms to be more than 15 percent per annum over
the period 1873-4 to 1891-2.

India registered a remarkable 18-fold increase

in wheat exports over the period,

It is no wonder then that U.S. farmers

were prompted to complain of unfair competition from India, as ironic as it
would seem today.
The comparatively slow growth in Ceylon would seem to be understandable
in view of the fact that Ceylon had to completely rebuild its export indus
try after its principle export crop was wiped out by the coffee leaf dis
ease in the 1870' s and conside,~ing that the first two attempts to replace
coffee failed for technical reasons.

25

Similarly, the compara~ively poor Chinese p~rformance can probably be
attributed to (1) the virtually complete absence of transport facilities
connecting the few

11

open ports" on the coasts with the interior, (2) the high

and rising ijlikin" or transit tax rate--rising because it was largely a spe
cific tax and prices were falling--(3) internal chaos and banditing, and
(4) the absence of adequate financial institutions.
24

Finally, it is perhaps

The products included were cotton, opium, seeds, rice, wheat, cotton
manufactures, jute, tea, iDdico, hides and skins, wool, and coffee,
25
see Snodgrass [95].
26 See Cheng [ 18] .
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appropriate to repeat the point m.'3.de earlier 27 that since the trade in Chinese
junks was not included in the Chinese trade statistics and because unrealistic
exchange rates were used in export evaluation, the growth of Chinese exports
during this period is undoubtedly understated,

Furthermore, China lost the

important export producing island of Formosa and also the Pescadores Islands
to Japan in 1895, and hence Chinese exports of the middle 1890's are not exactly
comparable with those of the mid-1870's.
Even though most of the paper countries devaluated their currencies sub
stantially with respect to gold, they do not offer the same advantages in
terms of the automaticity of devaluation.

In many cases the inconvertibilit y

of their currencies was pro~pted by difficulties in financing wars or in
servicing their foreign debt end for one reason or another many of these
countries suffered from instabilitytinf lation and other problems to a greater
degree than did the silver and gold countries.
attentfon will be paid to the,o.

For these reasons very little

However, it might be pointed out that in

general the slowest export growth was attained in the countries wich moved
toward the gold standard at the end of the period as in Austria-Hungary and
Russia, and thz most rapid growth was attained in countries such as Colombia,
Brazil and Greece whicl1 noved fu::ther away from parity with gold--thereby
providing sor.1e limited additional support for the iBporta.nce of exchange
rate policy

0:1

the grm·1th of exports.

Finally, in order to be as con.plcte as possible and thereby to reduce
the possibility that countries· which we ha•,e not been able to include in
tables 2-6 for lack of dato, would have displayed export performances at
27

See footnote 9 ~hove.
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variance with those of the other gold and silver countrie s covered in these
tables, we present in Table 7 compara ble data on imports of the United
States

from each of the other countrie s of North and South America ,and in

Table 8 the imports of Great Britain and France from some countrie s for
which data was either not presente d in the earlier tables or was not con
sidered very reliable .
Since these statisti cs refer, of course, only to a portion of a par
ticular country 's exports , they are certainl y not as reliable indicato rs of
performa nce as the data in the previous tables.
some indicati on of some addition al evidenc e.

Neverth eless, they offer

For example , Table 7 shows

that Santa Domingo, the lone Caribbea n country on silver, increase d its
average annual exports to the U.S. in 1893-5 to more than five times its
1870-4 average while each of the other gold standard countrie s in the re
gion (Cuba, the Danish,F rench and Dutch West Indies, Puerto Rico, and to
a lesser extent Haiti) displaye d extreme ly poor export perform ance.

Table

8 offers some indicati on that the export industri es of the Portugu ese and
Spanish colonies (all effectiv ely on a par with gold) may also have ex
perience d extreme ly bad times.
The results presente d in these tables would seem to be quite consis
tent with our previous estimate that the merchan dise exports (in value
terms) of gold standard countrie s may have been growing at about 1 percent
per annum while those of silver standard countrie s were probably growing at
better than 4 percent per annum, give or take a percent .

While it has not

been general ly possible to estimate the growth in volume of exports , where
we have been able to obtain such estimat es, the rate would seem to be at
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U.S. Imports from the American Countries and Colonies
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Silver Countries

1870-1874 Average

Central America
Chile 1,4
Ecuador2
Mexiio
Peru
Santa Domingo

1.4
.93

Total

.4

8.0
1.6

1893-1895 Average
10.7
4.0
1.2
22.1

.7

.4

2.3

12.7

41.0

8.4
42.1
72.6
.6
1.1
1.7
1.4
9.7
2.9
4.0
144.5

11.4
33.9
64.5
.4
.1

Gold Countries
British Guiana and West Indies
Canada
Cuba
Danish West Indies
Dutch West Indies
French West Indies
Haiti
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total

.o

1.8
2.3
2.0
6.8
123.2

Paper Countries
Argentina
Braz116
Colombia

31.3
5.9

Total

44.9

7.7

5.6
86.2
3.0
94.8

Notes:
1chile was on inconvertible
paper throughout part of this period.
2Ecuador
was on paper prior to stabilization and devaluation in 1884.
31893 only.
4Chile obtained
a considerable amount of land from which minerals were exported
from Bolivia and Peru as a result of war won by Chile 1880-1881.
5colombia was on gold
standard until 1886 and thereafter on inconvertible paper.
6

Brazilian exchange rate remained constant with respect to gold currencies until
a series of devaluations beginning in 1890-1891.

-39Table 7 (continued)

Sources:

1870-2: Bureau of the American Republics (13, pp. 32-4).
1872-3:

U.S. House of Representatives (105, Third Session, 42nd

Congress, p. 79].
1873-4:

U.S. House of Representatives (105, First Session, 43rd

Congress, p. 101].
1893-4: U.S. House of Representatives [105, Third Session, 53rd
Congress, Vol. 26, No. 6, P, LVII].
1894-5:

U.S. House of Representatives [105, First Session, 54th

Congress, Vol. 30, N. 13, Part 1, p. XX.XII].
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French and British Imports from Gold and Silver Countries and
Colonies for which Data is Completely or Totally
Missing in Other Tables
British Imports in
millions of British l:i
Gold Standard Countries
Algeria
Azores
Canary Islands
Cuba and Puerto Rico
Dutch Guiana
Dutch West Indies
Fernando Po
Haiti
Italy
Macao
Madeira
Morocco
Portuguese Africa
Switzerland
Tunis and Tripoli
Turkey
Uruguay

1872-4
Average

1892-4
Average

438
317
419
4788
167
52
32
358
3862
1106
74
785
127

596
65
285
155
26
17

French Imports in
millions of francs

1870-5
Average

1894-6
Average

108

185

30

15

1

1

35
440

71
215

5

63
3105
6
62

555
72

320

335

177
5784
1375
18,861

346
5142
229

182
39

133
29

10,729

1155

984

Bolivia
Ecuador
Guatemala
Indochina
Japan
Mexico
Philippines

286
1000
19
400
497
1405

187
1100
89
980
531
1981

.02
1.9
1.7
.6
57.2
7.5
1.6

.22
9.9
6.5
19.7
74.8
13.2

--2.!i

Total of Above Countries

3607

4868

70.5

129.7

Total of Above Countries
Silver Standard Countries

Sources:

Great Britain:
France:

United Kingdom, Board of Trade

France, Direction Generale des Douanes
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least three or four times the rate of increase in value of exports--generally
a higher multiple in silver standard countries (due to.more rapidly falling
export prices) than in the gold standard countries.

Even the apparently

slowest growing silver standard countries were in real terms undergoing a
more or less continuous export boom of considerable magnitude.

v.

Other Growth Indicators Compared
According to the findings of the previous section there would seem to be

much support for the existence of a positive effect of continuous devaluaIt remains to be seen, though, to what

tion on long-run export performance.

extent and in what direction export growth resulting at least partially from
devaluation has affected economic welfare and development in a broader sense.
Unfortunately, statistical limitations make it impossible to obtain more
fundamental indicators of development, such as per capita income, for area
sonably large sample of countries.

We shall proceed by surveying individual

gold standard and subsequently silver standard countries utilizing national
income statistics wherever possible and supplementing them with relevant
descriptive material.

In order to focus more narrowly on the development

process, from now on we shall confine our attention almost exclusively to
countries in the beginning stages of economic development.
A.

The Gold Standard Countries:
DUTCH EAST INDIES

Perhaps the most interesting experience among the various countries on
the gold standard was that of the Dutch East Indies.

The Dutch East

Indies provides an interesting example not only because it was the only major
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gold standard country in Asia in the period under investigation, but also be
cause the period 1870-1894 was a unique period in the long and varied ex
perience of Dutch rule in which liberalism (at least by Dutch colonial standards) prevailed.

28

Among the reforms undertaken in this period were (1) the

granting of rights of private ownership (especially of land) to natives,
(2) importation of Chinese to assist development, (3) a dramatic step-up in
development expenditures of the government (mainly on roads with the specific
purpose of speeding transportation of commodities for export, but also on
irrigation, education, harbors, experimental stations, forestry services, and
internal communications), and (4) a cut in export tax rates.
What was the outcoma of these impressive development-oriented reforms
and programs in a period of falling export prices and exchange appreciation
relative to neighboring silver countries?
but a few impressions may be sufficient.

Hard data is unfortunately lacking
For one thing there were a series

of bank and business failures ending in mergers and monopolization.

Furnivall

notes that neither imports nor production ~f cotton goods and rice (the most
important wage goods) were able to keep up with population growth between

1875 and 1900, indicating a decline in the welfare of the masses.
11

The native not only drc1·1 lower wages, but he had less work, as the

economies consequent on the crisis,

such as the substitution of imported

fertilizers for stable m~nure, of imported gunny-bags for home-woven baskets
and of light railways for carting, left the people with fewer opportunities
to earn money 11 (Furnivall [44, p. 214].

(Note how indicative these

phenomena are of an increasingly overvalued currency!)

One consequence of

the refo:r.ms was that, in contrast to previous periods in which administration
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of the Dutch East Indies generated a sizeable revenue surplus for use in
Holland, the Dutch East Indies became for the first time a deficit opera
tion.

As a result of increased costs of administration with so little to

show for it in terms of development (e.g., Table 4 showed that the increase
in the value of exports was less than 30 percent in 20 years).

It is no

wonder that after 1895 the Dutch reverted back to interventionism and pa
ternalism rationalized by the Dntch economist-administrato r J. H:. Boeke in
his well-known theory of social dualism:
"When the native, the tani, enjoyed the growing of a crop
or labor was too much for him.

no care

But he could find real pleasure

only when the product satisfied one of his ovm needs, and these
needs were few, unexactir:.s

and of little variety.

As a rule,

the tani did not, of his own accord, produce for the Western mar
kct--or, in.deed, for any market, if in an exceptional case he did
so, it had to be w:!.th the slightest possible expenditure of labor
and other costs, therefore, through some form of quite extensive
cultivation.

In other words, the exertion uas worth his while

only if he could gather the harvest without having been obliged
to pay much attention to the growing of the crop."

Boeke [9, p. 2].

One wonders how much Boeke 9 s views,and for that matter the modern history of the Dutch East Indies mtght have been altered if this rather unique
period of liberalism had been bo~n into an environ:nent in which the economic
incentives for increased production and export, such as might have been pro
vided by a depreciating cu;:·;:ency, would have existed!
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EGYPT
The experie nce of Egypt was in many ways simila r.

Egypt was on a bi

metall ic standar d and effecti vely on silver until 1885 and only therea fter
switche d to gold.

Althoug h the Egyptia n case is compli cated by nation al

bankru ptcy and an auster ity program imposed by foreign credito rs, despite
ted.
enormous capita l expend itures on dams, transp ortatio n, etc., Egypt stagna
a
Once again per capita consumer goods imports decline d sharpl y--ind icating
decline in the per capita income of the masses.

Head [71]

notes"~:- a rise

y
in unemployment and underemployment in the 1890's and attribu tes it entirel
by
to the fact that the Delta Barrag e Dam of 1890 reduced labor require ments
raising the water level in the irrigat ion canals,

In view of the finding s

of our compar isons of silver and gold standar d countr ies and the theore tince
cal expect ations outline d in Section II, we might sugges t with some confide
im
that the exchang e rates may have had someth ing to do with it by favorin g
ports to domest ic import substi tutes or exports and lowerin g the prices of
importe d capita l goods relativ e to labor.

NEW ZEALAND
About New Zealand after 1880 we learn the followi ng:
"There followe d the gloomi est period of the countr y's history : all
but absolu tely necessa ry expend iture was checke d, develop ment was
suspend ed, public soup-k itchens were found necess ary, civil ser
vants had their salarie s retrenc hed 10 percen t all round.
Scho'le field in "The Evolut ion of New Zealand " talks of unemploy
ment, sweatin g, lowered wages, and genera l stagna tion of industr y •••
A Sweatin g Commission found evidenc e of unheal thy crowdin g, and
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of overwork of women and girls, ••••••

Not only were money wages

falling faster than prices but unemployment was scarce and in
secure.11

(Condli ffe [25, p. 955]).

Condlif fe goes on to show that even the marrtage rate (standar dized for
populati on growth) showed a drop of more than 20 percent between 1871-5 and
1891-5 [25, p. 951-2].

Thus is would seem that even New Zealand , which ac-

cording to Table 2 was perhaps the star export perform er among the gold
standard countrie s, shared with the other less develope d gold standard coun
tries stagnati on, unemployment and probably some decline in per capita income.

OTHER GOLD STANDARD COUNTRIES
In Austral ia populati on exactly doubled between 1874 and 1897 from
750,000 to 1,500,00 0, while accordin g to Butlin [14, Table 269, p. 460] real
GDP (in 1910-11 prices)- -which had doubled between 1861 and 1873--ro se only
from ~95.9 million to ~173.8 million in 1897.

Hence per capita income de

clined in Austral ia as well.
In Jamaica , accordin g

to Eisner

[34, p. 289],

per capita income

showed no growth between !870 and 1890 despite relative ly favorab le prices
for most of its main exports (especia lly wood, ginger, bananas , and cocoa),
and unusual ly cheap land.
Clough [21, p. 369]

reports a figure for Italian per capita

income in 1938 prices of 1895 lire in 1871-5 and one for 1891-5 of 1888 lire
again indicati ng a slight loss in real per capita income.
Because of its lesser dependen ce on internat ional trade and no doubt
an enormou sly benefic ial opening-·up from the railroad boom, the United States
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was evidently able to record a fairly satisfactory increase in real per capita
GNP,

29

but this record seems to have been unusual even for the more highly

developed countries on the gold standard.

30

As it would appear from the

evidence cited above for several of the less developed gold standard countries,
the poor performance of exports would seem to have carried over to per capita
income as well.

Thus, it seems unlikely that per capita income increased at

all in these countries during the entire two decade period, and in several
such countries real per capita income probably fell.

B.

Devaluating Countries on Silver and Paper Standards

MEXICO
Although "hard data" are hard to come by for Uexico, the following
description of the period should show that the Mexican experience of 18701900 was very different from that which has been observed for the less de
veloped gold standard countries during the same period of time.
0

In the 30 years preceding the Revolution of 1910, it seemed that Mexico

was on the path of sustained growth in per capita production as the result
of domestic peace and of the absorption of the Mexican economy into the
world economy.

An inflow of foreign capital was

making possible the con

struction of railroads, the extension of mining, and an increase of foreign
and domestic trade. 11
29

(Edminster [ 33, p. 332] •

According to statistics published in United States, Bureau of the Census
[104, p. 7 and p. 144), per capita GNP in the U.S. at 1929 prices rose at well
over 1 percent per annum.
30
Even in industry, an index of industrial production for the major gold
standard countries shows that industrial production did not much more than
double in the period, thus indicating rather slow growth in per capita terms.
[111, p. 69).
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What statistics there are of the industrial sector show that in the 20
year period between 1878 and 1898 textile production tripled and mining-31
metallurgy more than quadrupled its real output.

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
While Argentina and Brazil were on inconvertible paper and therefore not
exactly comparable with the silver countries it is interesting to note the
amazing degree of development achieved within the brief periods in which de
valuation was most pronounced--the 1880 9 s in Argentina and the 1890's in
Brazil.
"The decade from 1880 to 1890 is the great 'boom' period of Argentine
economic history.

It is not too much to say that in those 10 years Argentina

underwent a greater economic development than in all the preceding decades of
the century."

(Williams

[113, p. 27).

(Subsequent to 1891, especially in

1894, Argentina's paper currency appreciated and panic, and bankruptcy even
of the national and provincial governments resulted.
Meanwhile in Brazil, according to_ Baer

(Hilliams [37).

[6, p. 15)

the number of

industrial establishments almost doubled in the six years between 1889 and
1895 in which several large devaluations took place.

Most significant was

the development of the jute manufactures industry in Sao Paulo catering to
the large and thriving coffee export industry.

RUSSIA
All the available evidence seems to suggest that Russia enjoyed very
31This data is available in Mexico [ 72, p. 106) •

-48-

significant growth during this period before going on the gold standard herself at the end of the 19th century •... For example, Goldsmith_ [46,. p. -446. and-- pp. 462-·3}
·shows· that crop production almost doubled between 1871. and 1894, while industrial production tripled.

CEYLON
Despite the unusual technical difficulties experienced by Ceylon, it is
quite clear that her most satisfactory development extended beyond the con
fines of agriculture. . Employment. data provided by Snodgrass [ 9 5, p. 322]
shows that employment in manufacturing and mining more than doubled between
1881 and 1901.
Gunasekera points out that Ceylon, like several of the other silver ·
countries, experienced an investment b-oom based largely on foreign capital.
11

Ceylon, in fact, was experiencing during this period a vast investment

boom•. Contrary to the generally held view, the depreciation of the exchanges
was no hindrance to the investment of British capital.

In the island the

Swetthenham Commissioners remarked: 'The evidence we have is conclusive that
_the fall (in the exchange) has not prevented the introduction of all neces-.
sary English capital and it is stated that there is more capital offering for
investment on t·easonable tf\rms than has been the case before- 1 • 11
Even on the much discussed difficulty that the debtor colonial govern
ments were alleged to have had in paying fixed obligations in gold while. cur
rency devaluation was taking place~ the Ceylonese experience, as viewed-by
the Swettenham Commission, seems most convincing.
·"The greatly increased number of rupees required to meet these obligation~
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is beyond question a very serious matter, but so far the satisfactor y increase
in revenue has enabled the finance of the colony to bear the enhanced claims
without embarrassme nt.

The Commission is of the opinion that the prosperity

of the producing interest is the main cause of the satisfactor y condition of
all items of colonial revenue, and that if prosperity were materially checked
by a change in currency which also effected a saving to government in its
gold obligations , the direct saving might not be a sufficient compensatio n for
the probable shrinkage in revenue.ii

(As quoted by Gunasekera [48, p. 114].

INDIA
According to estimates of Mukerji [74, p. 701),

India's per

capita income in 1948-9 prices increased from 177 in 1871-79 to 203 in 188699.

If this is correct, it would represent the largest two-decade increase

in real per capita income in Indian history with the single exception of the
World Hart boom and the 7 or 8 years thereafter when India's (gold) currency
depreciated sharply with respect to silver!

Again it would seem that a

significant amount of industrializ ation was also achieved.

Varshney [109]

shows that between 1879 and 1892 the share of manufacture d goods in total
imports declined from 65 percent to 57 percent while the share of manufac
tures in exports rose from 8 percent to 16 percent.

CHINA
In Section IV, above, we reviewed a number of the more overriding ob
stacles to economic development in China between 1875 and 1895.

It might be

appropriate to mention another--th e series of natural disasters which ravaged

-50-

China in the late 1880's and early 1890 1 s.

According to Remer (88]

the Yellow River flood of 1888 killed two million people; the drought of 1893-4
killed another one million and the Mohammedan Rebellion immediately there
after another one-fourth million.
For these reasons and for lack of statistical material it might be rea
sonable to attribute the somewhat 1acklustre performance of the Chinese eco
nomy in this period to special factors and to seek evidence on China for
another period to determine whether something in the Chinese environment
would again make for an outcome less successful than that experienced by the
other devaluating countries.

China was virtually alone in remaining on the

silver standard continuously until 1935.

There is therefore another period-

much shorter period--between 1925 and 1931 in which the price of
32
This was,
silver was falling with respect to gold at a fairly rapid rate.
albeit a

of course, not a very prosperous period especially after 1929 elsewhere in
the world.

For example, in the U.S., real per capita GNP fell sharply and

exports in value terms dropped off disastrously from $4.9 billion in 1925
to $2.4 billion in 1931 and $1.6 billion in 1932 reflecting sharp drops in
both export prices and export volume.

Export volume alone dropped by more

than 35 percent during this brief period.

33

Meanwhile, China was not only able to maintain the volume of exports
but to increase it slightly from 132.9 to 136.5 (in index numbers provided
by Cheng

(18, p. 259].

Apparently, China's avoidance of the Great

32 The price index of silver in U.S. dollars fell from .694 in 1925 to
.290 in 1931 (Cheng (18, p. 263].
33These figures are based on those published in United States, Bureau
of Census [104, p. 537 and 541].
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Depression--at least until the appreciation of silver (1932-5) which prompted
China to depart from the silver standard in 1935--was a unique one.
export performance was not the only astonishing achievement.

China's

The number of

34
factories with more than 30 factories more than doubledbetween 1925 and 1933,
(17, p. 66]

the index of industrial production prepared by Chang

showed an

increase of 35 percent in these same six years in which the world index at
industrial production used by Lewis (64, p. 107]
percent.

showed a decline of 7

China was transformed from a net importer of cotton yarn to a sub

stantial exporter.

This progress is even more remarkable if one considers

the fact that many of the same obstacles to development we have noted in the
previous period persisted.
1931.

The

11

likin 11 ta:::es were not eliminated until late

There were still no uniform weights and measures, no corporation laws

for Chinese firms, and no patents; illiteracy was almost universal.

As Cheng

describes it:
"China was, for most of the period, in a state of instability, chaos,
and anarchy, torn by internal dissensions and partitioned geographically
1
by regional war lords •••• Economic barriers such as 'likin and other local

tolls and taxes, were too numerous to enumerate.

Trains were often derailed

and destroyed, rolling stocks seized, vessels commandeered by the warring
parties to disrupt commerce and industry" (18, p. 37].

JAPAN
Perhaps the star performer aoong the major silver countries in the period
under investigation was Japan.

Patrick's deflated version of Ohkawa's

34 Cheng (18] gives the number of such factories in 1926 as 1457 and in
1953 as 3450.

-52-

national income statistics

[80, p. 201]

shows that Japan's real national

income virtually toppled between 1878 and 1898.

To avoid the possibility of

distortions due to weather,KuzuEts utilizes 5 year averages [61, p. 269]which
show that even real per capita GDP was growing at 3 percent per annum.

In

providing incentives in terms of higher producer prices and increased export
opportunities, the falling exchange rate may help explain the rather phe
nomenal rate of increase in total agricultural productivity of almost 2 percent per annum (Hayami and Yamada

[49a, p. 157]

Rosovsky

[50, p. 321]

provides data in domestically produced capital goods which shows an almost
thirty-fold increase in real terms between 1873 and 1897 so that by the turn
of the century the capital goods sector accounted for more than 5 percent of
industrial output.

In view of the effect of exchange rate devaluation on

the price of imported capital goods, and in view of the rapidly expanding
investment opportunities in many export sectors, the formation of a domestic
capital goods industry should not seem surprising.

This rapidly developing

capital goods industry may have contributed more than its share of GNP by
helping to provide Japan with a technology more appropriate to Japanese fac
tor prices and conditions than the technology available from western coun
tries.
It should be admitted that Japan had many things going for it besides the
depreciation of silver--ranging from its heavy emphasis on the incentive
creating land tax to its rich cultural strength and heritage which was capa
ble of resisting any unfavorable international demonstration effect on
savings rates.

Nevertheless, the role of exchange depreciation in this
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35
growth process would seem to be worthy of greater attention.

VI.

Summary, Conclusions and Some Reservations
While there has been a voluminous theoretical literature on the immediate

effects or exchange devaluation, the long-run effects on development effects
have been almost completely neglected,

We have presented a brief outline of

our own views about the nature of this relationship--em phasizing its effect
on both the demand and supply side of exports and via exports on (1) tech
nological change and efficiency, (2) capital formation and (3) employment.
Although some recent attention has been devoted to the role of exchange rate
policy in determining export performance, most of these studies have not been
very successful in isolating this effect.

We have argued that one of the

main difficulties encountered in time series analysis of this kind is the
fact that, in addition to the positive effect which exchange rate devalua
tion would be expected to have on exports, in the long run exports would be
expected to affect exchange rates negatively, thereby plaguinc any such
analysis with the simultaneous equation bias.
In an effort to mitigate the influence of this bias, we have chosen to
study the period between J.874 and 1894 when the currencies of the vast ma
jority of countries in the world lJere convertible into either one of two
metals--gold or silver.

Since the price of silver in terms of gold fell

by approximately 50 percent during this period, the silver standard coun
tries implicitly and automatically devaluated with respect to gold countries
35Note, however, that Patrick [80] and Baba and Tatemoto [5] have re
cently devoted considerable attention to the relationship between exchange
rates and Japanese economic growth in the last 20 years of the 19th century.
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by an equal amount.

Since there were quite a few countries on each standard

in each region, level of development and other relevant characteristics, a
comparison of the silver (and paper) standard countries, on the one hand,
and the gold standard countries, on the other, with respect to export per
formance and other indicators

of development offers many advantages.

In

Section III we argued that previoup studies of these relationships in that
periodp not all of which yielded results supporting the relationship between
exchange devaluation and export growth, have suffered from several defects-
both logical and empirical--which would seem to warrant a reinvestigation
utilizing an international cross section of individual time series.
Although most of our attention has been limited to countries at lower
levels of development, our results provide strong evidence for the generality
and considerable strength of the relationship between exchange rate devalua
tion and both export performance and overall development.
The less developed gold standard countries were generally characterized
by extremely slow growth of exports and income, which in per capita terms

meant stagnation or even decline and frequently resulted in financial crisis,
unemployment and underemployment, excessive substitution of capital for
labor and of imports for domestic production, and reduced private capital
inflow to a trickle.
In contrast, most of the silver standard countries enjoyed a rate of
growth in exports in both value and volume terms three, four or more times
that of the gold standard countries.
suffered from unemployment.

None of the silver standard countries

Host of the silver countries experienced rapid

growth in real per capita income, investment booms (assisted by sizeable
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inflows of foreign capital, labor and managerial capability), and conspicu
ous improvements in efficiency.
Some implications of this analysis for theory are (1) that more work
should go into detailing the various alternative mechanisms by which exchange
rates affect long-run development and thereby to lay the foundation for fur
ther empirical work in which it might be possible to establish the relative
importance of each of these mechanisms, (2) that theoretical and empirical
investigations are needed in order to establish conditions under which de
valuations will be most successful and to determine the optimal rate of
exchange devaluation from the standpoint of development.
The policy implications would seem to be straightforward: continuous
exchange rate devaluation can be extremely beneficial to development even
when a number of other countries devaluate at the same time.

In fact, the

customs union effect of simultaneous devaluation would seem to have been
strong and healthy.

It provides the same benefits of an ordinary customs

union without some of the political problems and administrative costs that
go along with common markets.
to extra regional exports.

Yet it also provides important incentives

Given the rather bleak prospects for transferring

sizeable amounts of foreign resources from rich to poor nations, the simul
taneous and continuous devaluation of LDC currencies with respect to the
currencies of rich nations would seem to offer an alternative means to the
same end that is simpler to administer, perhaps more certain to be effective,
and undoubtedly politically more feasible.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to state several reservations.

In the

first place, we can expect that the last quarter of the 20th century will
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differ from the same quarter of the 19th century in several important ways:
(1)

Capital and labor were more mobile in the 19th century than they are
likely to be in the near future.

The ability of resources to move

to the areas of the world in which the incentives for export had been
created contributed significantly to the success of continuous devalua
tion.
(2)

In the absence of monthly computations of cost of living indexes, labor
may have been more vulnerable to a money illusion then than now, there
by facilitating increases in employment by camouflaged reductions in
real wages.

(3)

The automaticity of devaluation which make it politically much more
pallatable might be hard to duplicate in the framework of contemporary
international and national monetary institutions. 36

(4)

Quantitative restrictions are likely to play a significantly larger
role in international trade in the next 25 years than they did in the
period studied in this paper.

Such restrictions, of course, limit the

effectiveness of devaluation.
Secondly, until it is possible to discriminate more effectively between
the various mechanisms through which exchange depreciation affects economic
development, the possibility that the relationship is only spurious shall
remain.
Thirdly, a reservation concerning data limitations needs to be stated.
In as much as the data utilized in this study have been drawn from many
36 For an interesting investigation of the seriousness of the political
consequences of individual devaluations by less developed countries in
recent years see Cooper [26).
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different sources, often of dubious reliability, whose methods and sources
have not generally been investigated, and as better or more complete data
become available, the empirical results might well be subject to change.
Finally, it should be admitted that our estimate of the favorable
impact of devaluation on development in LDC's is a gross estimate and not
net of the unfavorable effect which devaluation on the part of the silver
countries imposed upon the non-devaluating countries.

From a world welfare

point of view, the net effect either on the world as a whole, or even on
the devaluating countries alone (owing to the limitations which slower
growth and balance of payments problems in the non-devaluating countries
would be likely to impose on their ability and willingness to export
capital) would likely

be smaller than the gross effects.

Nevertheless,

trade,which in any case is likely to be increased by the devaluation,is
undoubtedly a positive sum game and thus the gains of the devaluating coun
tries in a realistic (dynamic) sense are likely to greatly outweigh the
loss to the non-devaluating countries.
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